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If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long….Our security will require transforming the military you will lead --a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.
1 George W. Bush
In the wake of al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, America's security policy underwent significant changes, particularly in regard to anticipating the acts of terrorists and their supporters. On September 14, 2001 , Congress authorized the use of force against those who planned, perpetrated or harbored the 9/11 terrorists to prevent future strikes against the United States. The President's new strategy is different because it explicitly declares that the United
States will execute preemptive military operations when necessary. His strategy includes preventative actions to eliminate threats before they emerge, that is before threats are imminent. 7 He implies that the United States, in situations short of last resort, might employ preventative attacks or preventative war. Moreover, his statements suggest that America will hold other nations responsible for the acts of terrorists operating within or from their territory and that it reserves the option to preempt or prevent within those states. While other nations have employed anticipatory strategies, the United States has never before declared such a doctrine.
The President has added a new course of action to America's National Military Strategy and its armed forces must respond.
This Paper seeks to identify implications of the President's emerging preemptive doctrine for the Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, the paper employs just war and strategic military theory to model decision criteria for anticipatory self-defense, while utilizing the endsways-means paradigm for strategy analysis. After offering several definitions, the paper explores the theoretical foundations of anticipatory defense. A brief survey of historical examples of anticipatory defense sets the stage for analysis. After identifying three likely preemption types, the paper addresses means, as well as recommendations for DOD. Threats and risks are addressed throughout. While this paper is not intended to justify anticipatory selfdefense, it does conclude that there are instances that justify such action. This study hopes to contribute a start point for additional research on the topic.
DEFINITIONS
Anticipatory self-defense or striking an enemy before that enemy consummates his attack will take one of four forms. The fundamental discriminators in these forms are the concepts of imminent verses inevitable threats and attacks verses war. For the purpose of argument, this paper employs the following definitions.
• Preemptive Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
• Preemptive War: A war initiated on the basis of expectation and/or evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.
• Preventative Attack: An attack or raid initiated on the belief that the threat of an attack, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk.
• Preventative War: A war initiated on the belief that armed conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk. 8 As suggested earlier, President Bush, as well as advocates and critics of his new policy often mix all four forms into the term "preemption" without drawing needed distinctions. Since the word "imminent" appears in each form it is worth reviewing the definition of 'imminent'.
…to project, threaten, … ready to take place;…hanging threateningly over one's head…danger of being run over… 9 Temporally, imminent appears to be a subjective call. For example, combat forces set in attack positions could remain in such a status for long periods of time. Thus, some divining of the opponent's intent is necessary. Nonetheless, it helps to distinguish between forms of anticipatory defense. An imminent threat, ready to take place, is much closer in time than an inevitable one. An imminent threat has immediate ramifications if left unchecked. There is a moral component to this argument as well. If the cause is just, preventative actions may be more economical in terms of collateral damage and loss of life.
FOUNDATIONS OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
The foundation for rationalizing anticipatory defense rests in the legacy of Just War
Theory and International Law stretching back to St. Augustine. 11 An early Christian thinker, St.
Augustine and those who followed him tried to reconcile the competing moral principles of nonviolence and the evil of taking human life with the need to protect innocent human life through the use of force and violence. 12 This tradition produced a construct that has come to be known as jus ad bellum or The Just War Framework. The essential elements are:
• Just Cause
• Legitimate Authority Webster's doctrine implies just intent, last resort, and perhaps proportionality.
Matriculating through history, the concepts of nation state, sovereignty, just war, and the right to self-defense have coalesced in international norms that were codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." 17 The authors of Article 51 clearly intended it for nation-states. 18 Moreover, the concept of 'armed attack' did not anticipate terrorist attacks by non-state actors such as those of 9/11. Sean D.
Murphy argues:
While there have been spirited debates over the right to engage in "anticipatory self-defense," most governments and scholars, and the International Court of Justice, appear to agree that self-defense is permitted under Article 51, but only when there has been an "armed attack." Yet the type of armed attack has been less studied. 
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE IN STRATEGIC MILITARY THEORY
A survey of classic theoretical works offers little with regard to preemption, preemptive war or preventative war. Sun Tzu's platitudes addressing the importance of surprise and knowing the enemy offer tenuous relation to preemptive strategies. 25 Surprise may play a role in striking an imminent threat or in choosing the time and place of preventative strikes or war. However, knowing the enemy's intent is a crucial element in determining whether or not to launch preemptive or preventative action. Likewise the theory of the "indirect approach" offered by B.H.
Liddell Hart bears some similarity to preemption in that the defender attempts to catch his enemy off guard by striking as the latter executes his attack. 26 Clearly, the whole idea of preemption implies an ability to gain some form of advantage on the erstwhile attacker-even if only in a tactical sense.
Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity" possesses significant relevance to the 'Just War
Framework' and preemption. 27 In his effort to explain the phenomenon of war he described its dominant tendencies as …primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
28
The great Prussian ties each part of this trinity to "the people…the commander and army", and "the government" respectively.
29
Clausewitz' trinitarian paradigm correlates with the "Just War" construct and provides insights into some of its key elements. In just war theory the political aims of the government are manifest in the concept of legitimate authority. These political aims are further related to the public declaration that the legitimate authority should issue. Clausewitz describes war as an instrument of policy subject to the realm of reason. 30 Reason it can be argued--in an ideal senseshould employ war only with just intent, proportionality and as a last resort. Moreover, the rational leader should not launch a war without a reasonable hope of success.
Likewise, in Clausewitz' description of the passions inherent in the populace, he accounts for the importance of obtaining domestic and international legitimacy. 31 Certainly, in a democracy such as the United States, and even more so in a coalition or body like the UN, the support of the populace offers not only legitimacy but moral support for a just cause.
Conversely, preemptive and preventative military actions may inflame the passion of those sympathetic to America's foes.
When Clausewitz speaks of the "commander and army" where the "the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam" he accommodates just war theory's proportionality, last resort and reasonable hope of success. 32 Political leaders depend on the military to create viable options for the application of force. The military determines the lead-time required for a preemptive strike and by default determines whether there is time available to apply means other than force. It determines the chance or risk involved and provides the leader with probability of success. Likewise, the military will determine the chance of minimizing collateral damage. The political leaders must then consider the risks of the unintended consequences of military action. Of course the Clausewitzian concept of friction is at play in all of these calculations.
A superbly prepared military, capable of operational success, is rarely a cure for faulty strategy resulting from a mismatch between capability, strategy and aim.
…the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. Early cold war theorists provide the most direct analyses of preemptive strategies. They directed their efforts at making sense of nuclear warfare and explored preemptive concepts with greater rigor than their predecessors. Nonetheless caution is required when searching for contemporary utility in their writings given the differences between nuclear warrisking an end to civilization-and the war on terrorism. One theorist who provides insights for current students of preemption is Bernard Brodie. In his landmark work Strategy in the Missile Age Brodie produced an approach to nuclear strategy that the United States employed through the end of the cold war. 34 Brodie traced the evolution of strategic thought from Clausewitz to the 1950s, emphasizing the obsolescence of traditional concepts in the missile age.
Brodie believed that nuclear weapons, with their inherent destructiveness, were exclusively offensive instruments with no defensive capability. Thus the primacy of the defense as the stronger form of war was invalid in the nuclear era. 35 Paradoxically, the traditional strength of the offense, seizing the initiative by striking first at the time and place of the attacker's choosing, no longer held merit when the outcome might be mutual destruction. 36 Moreover, with the risk of enormous losses in nuclear war, Brodie believed that a victory in strategic nuclear war might provide little advantage over defeat. 37 Advocating a strategy based on deterrence, Brodie argued against strategies based on anticipatory defense. Attempting to highlight the dilemma in anticipatory strategies he mused:
…the philosophy of "I won't strike first unless you do," though the phrase should no doubt be edited to read, "unless you attempt to." Anyway there is the insistence that come what may, "I will strike first!"-though the "I" agrees to wait long enough so that my qualms on moral grounds are automatically resolved. 38 Brodie felt that American values argued against preemptive strategies. He believed such strategies placed undue burden for decision making on the shoulders of the President. 39 Moreover, he believed it was beyond America's capability to divine the inevitability of nuclear war. 40 Despite his focus on nuclear warfare against a symmetrical threat, and his inability to predict a future populated by international terrorists and rogue states, Brodie's analysis of preemptive strategies provides pertinent insights on America's current policy. For preemption to be valid, Brodie emphasized the requirement for precise intelligence to identify imminent threats with great certainty. That same quality of intelligence was required to target and preempt threats. He envisioned the President as the ultimate decision-maker in determining whether threats were truly imminent and whether attacking preemptively was warranted. Finally, to justify preemption the President would require strong evidence to persuade the American populace of just cause when striking first. 41 Just war theory and Clausewitz' trinity echo in Brodie's writings.
Michael Walzer adds useful insights on anticipatory self-defense in Just and Unjust Wars.
Walzer not only accepts preemption as a legitimate form of self-defense, but he also criticizes views holding an overly legalistic interpretation of imminent threat. Thus he offers alternative approaches more sympathetic to the President's new policy. To Walzer, the legalists see
Webster's interpretation of preemption as "a reflex action, a throwing up of one's arms at the very last minute." 42 Walzer believes this view is too restrictive when the safety of the nation's citizens and allies is at risk. He adds, "The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at the point of sufficient threat. 43 Walzer defines sufficient threat as "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk." 44 His approach accommodates both preemptive and preventative actions and simplifies the criteria for a just war to two fundamental principles: it must be a defensively motivated last resort and "its anticipated costs to soldiers and civilians alike must not be disproportionate to (greater than) the value of its ends." 45 Walzer's thoughts on just war theory and anticipatory self-defense correlate with President
Bush's strategy.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE PREVENTATIVE WAR: IMPERIAL JAPAN 1941
On December 7, 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy struck Pearl Harbor with a surprise attack of devastating proportions. This unannounced initiation of war was the opening blow in a war of conquest. It was followed by near simultaneous attacks stretching from the Hawaiian Islands to the Indian Ocean. Japan launched a preventative war intended to create a strategic situation so intimidating to the United States that a negotiated settlement to Japan's advantage would result. Japanese strategists believed that these surprise attacks were the only way Japan could prevail in a war that the United States would inevitably thrust on them.
Between 1895 and 1941, radical nationalism dominated Japan. Meanwhile Japanese leaders felt exploited in their dealings with Western Powers and that these efforts put Japan in an inferior position. 46 Nevertheless, it was Japan's designs on China that led to war with
America. The League of Nations censured Japan after her invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and
Japan protested by withdrawing from the League. 47 Near Peking, a minor engagement between Japanese and Chinese forces on July 7, 1937 escalated to another war. 48 By 1939, after initial Japanese successes, the fighting in China devolved into a war of attrition. 49 To win the war, Japan endeavored to isolate China and obtain additional resources in Indo-China. The fall of France and the Low Countries in 1940 provided an opportunity. 50 Despite American warnings, in September 1940 the Japanese landed in French Indo-China. 51 These moves triggered American restrictions on oil and scrap metal trade with Japan. 52 Further Japanese advances in the region during 1941 brought tighter U.S. trade restrictions. 53 To continue the war in China Japan needed resources, particularly oil. Without oil from America and without a change in policy Japan could only obtain oil in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese estimated their oil reserves at only six months without oil from the U.S. or other sources. Japanese attempts to reverse America's embargo through negotiation were unsuccessful. In the meantime American strength in the Pacific grew while American industry geared up for war.
Japan's leaders decided to seize the resource areas they required. On September 4, 1941 they chose a path leading to preventative war with the United States. They decided on war because they believed the seizure of resource areas would trigger American intervention. 54 Our Empire will (1) for the purpose of self-defense and self preservation complete preparations for war, (2) concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the USA and Great Britain and thereby endeavor to attain our objectives. (3) In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October … we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. 55 Eventually, the deadline for decision was extended to November 30, 1941. 56 Rather then allow the Iraqis to produce a weapon of mass destruction, capable of hitting Israel's urban areas, they would strike before Iraq could build a bomb. 77 Despite Arab vows to destroy
Israel the activation of the reactor was not an imminent threat. However, in the eyes of Israeli leaders the threat was inevitable and allowing the reactor to go on-line was not worth the risk.
With an operational reactor, Saddam Hussein would inevitably produce a nuclear weapon and the Israelis believed it would be employed to threaten or strike them. Furthermore, an Iraqi nuclear weapon would provide a deterrent to Israel's nuclear capability. The similarities with current events surrounding Iraq are obvious.
HISTORY AND THE JUST WAR CONSTRUCT
Applying the "just war framework" to these historical examples provides numerous insights. Moreover, those insights contribute to the construction of American decision criteria for anticipatory self-defense.
JUST CAUSE/JUST INTENT Japan's justification for war was couched in preventative war rhetoric. A warped sense of just cause was an excuse for war. Nonetheless Japan's aim was to subjugate, exploit and enslave the areas it conquered. Clearly the Japanese cause and intent were unjust. Most of the world saw Japan's aggression for what it was and her example demonstrates the risks inherent in justifying a policy of anticipatory defense. Assuming America's motivations are just in regard to anticipatory defense and that eventually most of the world will accept the policy, how long will it take for a rogue state to invoke a similar policy as an excuse for aggression? In In the '67 War the IDF limited their objectives and refrained from seizing additional territory or continuing the war to inflict greater losses on their opponents. Likewise, they limited the Osirak Raid to the reactor alone when additional air strikes to suppress Iraqi air defenses could have been executed.
LAST RESORT
In terms of "last resort," Tojo had alternatives to wars of aggression and there was no evidence of an imminent American attack or even inevitable entry into the war if Japan refrained from attacking American forces. The Japanese could have withdrawn from China and IndoChina. They deemed this unacceptable. They could have limited their attacks to the specific resource areas they required. They determined this was too risky and expected such attacks would trigger American intervention. This is not to say that a future declaration of war and intervention by the Americans was impossible. Despite a strong isolationist sentiment in the United States, American efforts at mobilization and her economic restrictions on precious war material were threats to Japan's security. 
REASONABLE HOPE OF SUCCESS
Calculating the potential for success, the Japanese accepted enormous risks as evidenced in the sleeping giant remarks of Admiral Yamamoto. Military advisors predicting a successful conclusion to the war within three months of the Pearl Harbor attack left Emperor
Hirohito exasperated. 79 The Japanese strategic estimate was flawed and based more on wishful thinking and pride than hard calculations. The Israelis believed they would succeed, skillfully calculated the risks involved in their operations and applied measures to mitigate those risks.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE IN AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
Americans see the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a dastardly sneak attack. Thus, when people speak of preemption many Americans conjure up images of an unjust, unannounced, surprise attack. However, the United States has a tradition albeit a small one of preemptive attacks. American presidents and senior military leaders have seriously considered, planned for and even executed preemptive/preventative operations when they believed such operations were necessary. Interestingly, as stated earlier, Daniel Webster provided one of the earliest documented rationales for preemptive attack.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Ward applied defensive rules of engagement to execute a preemptive attack on a Japanese midget submarine outside of Pearl
Harbor. 80 Likewise, prior to December 11, 1941 , US warships in the Atlantic engaged German submarines. 81 In the late 1930s the Marine Corps planned to seize Caribbean and Atlantic
Islands and littorals to preempt the Nazis in areas they might obtain through diplomatic means. 88 Occasionally they were overt, as was the case in the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion. 89 Arguably, NATO's brief war with Serbia in 1999 was a preventative war on behalf of the Kosovar Muslims. 90 Notwithstanding the preventative nature of these endeavors none of them rise to the scope of action that President Bush is now contemplating.
Pundits musing that preemption is a radical break with American tradition ignore significant portions of the nation's history. Senior American senior leaders did not hesitate to
give anticipatory defense strategies serious consideration when they were the only practical expedients in difficult national security situations. This was particularly true in the Cold War when America's survival was at stake.
It is difficult to equate the arsenal of today's terrorists and rogue states with the destructive capacity of the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless the Soviets, however threatening, never struck the United States. Al-Qaeda attacked America with great cost to the nation. Given the demonstrated ability of terrorists to strike America and the potential wedding of weapons of mass destruction with future terrorist attacks, the President's anticipatory strategy is valid. The question becomes one of when to act preemptively or preventatively. However, this strategy is juxtaposed with the American cultural bias against starting wars. Because of these dilemmas, consideration of just war criteria and legitimacy could prove useful to the effective application of the President's strategy. With this in mind, it makes sense to find a paradigm that justifies and provides decision criteria for an American strategy of anticipatory self-defense.
PROPOSED DECISION CRITERIA FOR ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
Whenever possible DOD should develop scenarios and capabilities to counter potential threats. Moreover, it should request presidential criteria for likely scenarios and thresholds for preemptive and preventative actions. In the absence of such criteria DOD should war-game and recommend its own. With some modification the "just war" framework is a solid start point. 91 A principled, moral approach to the problem based on a long standing ethical foundation that reflects most Americans' sense of fair play not only has value in deciding whether to attack preemptively but would serve the nation well in justifying such actions.
While it seems evident that scenarios requiring preemptive actions are a crisis some cases, like contemplating preventative war in Iraq, will not require time constrained crisis response. In regard to crisis action planning, DOD's current joint doctrine remains sound and applicable. 92 However, criteria for the employment of preemption would be useful in both crisis response and deliberate planning.
Imminent/Inevitable Threat:
Determined by the President on a case by case basis with regard to imminent threats. When he deems the threat inevitable, he should consult Congress or request its endorsement. There must be a high probability that a threat attack will inflict significant damage to the United States or its citizens if action is not taken to defeat or destroy that threat.
In cases involving WMD:
• Adversary possesses or is on the verge of possessing WMD • Adversary intends to use WMD or make them available to others who will • Risk of waiting for absolute certainty is unacceptably high
Legitimate Authority: The President backed by domestic and multi-lateral support when possible. When he deems the threat inevitable he should, as a minimum, consult Congress or request its for endorsement. In preventative actions he should make every reasonable effort to garner domestic and international legitimacy prior to acting.
Public Declaration:
Whenever possible the United States should signal its intention to preempt prior to acting. To some degree America's stated policy in regard to anticipatory defense already signals this intent. If the United States chooses not to signal prior to a specific action, it must assume responsibility and provide evidence of the threat as soon as possible following an attack. In the case of preventative actions it should provide signals and a demarche.
Just Intent: The US objective must aim at eliminating imminent or inevitable threats to the United States and its citizens and not make an attempt at aggrandizement or material gain.
Proportionality: Sufficient force should be employed to accomplish the mission. However, damage and casualties inflicted should be limited to only those required to destroy or defeat the threat. Standing Rules of Engagement should be developed and modified as required based on the situation surrounding each operation. Whenever possible, non-lethal weapons should be employed. As a general rule, anticipatory defensive actions should be confined to operations with non-nuclear forces.
Last Resort: Preemptive action is the only course of action possessing a reasonable chance of eliminating the threat prior to it inflicting unacceptable harm to Americans or the United States. In the case of preventative actions the application of every element of national and international power possible should be attempted prior to attack or war.
Reasonable Hope of Success:
The actions undertaken by the United States must have a high probability of accomplishing the mission of destroying the targeted threat with minimal collateral damage.
This construct is not absolute or all-inclusive. As F.G. Hoffman states, "Prescriptive approaches rarely meet the tests of history, particularly in dynamic time periods." 93 However, these criteria or a set like them could be a tool to guide the thoughts of the nation's senior decision-makers. Ultimately each preemptive action will require an estimate of the situation, however brief, and a decision based on the information available at the point of decision.
The United States could publicize criteria or casi belli for anticipatory self-defense. The announcement that a rational and morally based paradigm was in place to guide US actions would reinforce domestic and international legitimacy. Furthermore, explaining a preemptive action after the fact by employing the criteria possesses value. However, a strong opposing argument can be made against publishing criteria, as they would provide the basis for criticism in the event that one or more of the criteria were not entirely met. In any case such criteria should never back the President into a corner.
DOD should recommend that the President exhaust all viable efforts to win support of the international community through a coalition, the UN or both before he commits to preemptive or empowered the President to order preemptive actions. Nevertheless, given the gravity of a decision to act preemptively against or in another nation state, Congressional endorsement is the best demonstration of domestic legitimacy.
STRATEGY: THE ENDS-WAYS-MEANS OF ANTICIPATORY DEFENSE

ENDS
With or without preemption in America's National Military Strategy, DOD will assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries, deter aggression and coercion, and decisively defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. 95 However, given the specific reference to preemption in the latest NSS, DOD must prepare to defeat terrorist threats with global reach and rogue states before they attack America. 96 This is one line of operations in the war on terror. The ends achieved by preemptive measures will not in themselves bring about victory. They contribute to the overall ends. Such attacks will aim to destroy terrorists by attacking their fighting elements in their sanctuaries, as well as attacks on their leadership, command, control and communications. 97 Moreover, given the President's statements, the United States military must be prepared to execute preemptive or preventative wars when threats warrant them.
WAYS
Ways or courses of action to counter threats where anticipatory self-defense applies will likely fall under one of three categories: signaled, unannounced, and clandestine preemption/ prevention.
Signaled Preemption/Prevention
At first blush, signaling would appear to contradict the "imminent threat" context normally associated with self-defense and justifiable preemption. However, signaled preemption could include a public warning or demarche to potential threats. Signals include presidential statements, Congressional hearings and resolutions as well as a clearly stated intent to strike declared at the United Nations. Media diplomacy could send similar signals. The President and most of his Cabinet have already done this. Signaling, to some degree, mitigates objections that might be raised to a surprise attack or lack of "public announcement" in just war theory. 98 Here America would avoid much of the stigma attached to an unannounced initiation of hostilities in the tradition of surprise attacks perpetrated by aggressor nations throughout history.
In some cases the United States may have to solicit the support of friendly, neutral or unsympathetic nations to grant permission to act in their territory for preemptive or preventative attacks. Other situations might call for action within a coalition. All of these cases would fall under the signaled category. Some nations might agree to American preemption in specified contingencies. Preemptive attack, preemptive war, preventative attack and preventative war are conceivable in the context of the signaled category. In fact, given the American ethos in regard to striking first, it is difficult to envision preventative war in any other context. The President's current challenge in garnering legitimacy for a preventative war against Iraq is a case in point.
Unannounced Preemption/Prevention
Unannounced action is a less desirable course of action but nonetheless one for which scenarios can be envisioned. The President could order a preemptive attack, without warning, when it is imperative to eliminate an imminent attack originating from a critical mobile target in a time-constrained environment. In the extreme, this situation could manifest itself in a nation loading and preparing to launch WMD armed missiles at targets in America or her allies. At the other end of the spectrum is a terrorist cell transiting or staging in another country in preparation for an imminent attack. It is entirely plausible that there will be cases where there is little time to consult with or obtain some form of international or domestic support before preempting.
Unannounced preemption does not obviate the need for post strike justification. Once an attack is complete, America must be prepared to provide convincing evidence of the necessity for action. Preemptive and preventative attacks are conceivable in the context of unannounced actions. However, given the American ethos in regard to anticipatory self-defense, it is difficult to envision preemptive or preventative war in this context.
Clandestine Preemption/Prevention
The discrete elimination of impending attacks on America or US citizens is the final type Consideration should be given to an expansion of these forces, despite the challenges inherent in balancing end-strength, maintaining quality, and optimizing reserve component roles.
101
American leaders expect the war on terrorism to be long, and transformation efforts may provide opportunity for such an effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Besides the recommendations already discussed, the analysis leads to five additional areas that merit attention in the context of anticipatory self-defense. They are rules of engagement (ROE), interagency operations, information operations, non-lethal attack and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Unfortunately the limited scope of this paper prevents detailed examination of these topics.
The requirement to create rules of engagement (ROE) for forces committed to preemptive and preventative attacks--particularly in clandestine operations--is critical. 102 While a general ROE for such actions must be developed, a discrete ROE for each strike will have to be refined on a case by case basis.
103
The importance of C4ISR in the GWOT and preemption in particular is obvious. Focused, actionable intelligence is the lynch pin of any preemptive or preventative endeavor, particularly in terms of targeting, planning, and justification. In the business of preemption, minutes could decide success or failure. Streamlining the dissemination of intelligence while maintaining appropriate security must become a priority. 
CONCLUSIONS
The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it.
109
Albert Einstein
The President may order anticipatory defense, in the form of preemptive or preventive military action, to protect the United States from terrorism and rogue states. This strategy is one line of operations in a more holistic strategy in the war on terror. Thus the ends achieved by preemptive measures will not in themselves bring about victory. They can only contribute to the overall ends.
Despite publicity surrounding the announcement of the strategy, anticipatory defense will occur infrequently, and only when risks are too significant to do otherwise. Nonetheless preemptive or preventive actions, even when immediately successful, will incur other risks.
While this doctrine does little to alter the fundamental ends of the nation's military strategy, it does add a page to the armed forces playbook. This course of action or "way" will manifest itself as signaled, unannounced, or clandestine military action. DOD has the means to execute these ways. The "just war" framework is a start point for the creation of decision criteria. DOD should develop such criteria and refine plans and tactics that optimize employment of its very capable means. The recommendations of this paper are one small step in that direction.
Empty blocks on Manhattan's Lower West Side testify that the world is a dangerous place.
Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks did not destroy the United States but they had a tumultuous impact on imminent threat. Meanwhile, the same court found the British government at fault for poor control of the operation. The court did not order any compensation to the families of the terrorists -who brought the case -because it was clear that the IRA personnel intended to detonate their bomb. The incident brought significant pressure and loss of face on the British Government. The Gibraltar case highlights the risks America faces in terms of justifying preemptive strikes against terrorists. Just as salient in this example is the importance of developing rules of engagement (ROE) for forces executing preemptive strikes. See "Death on the Rock: Unlawful Killing," The Economist 336 (September 30, 1995): 67.
103 jus in bello criteria can be found in Cook, 27-29. 104 As part of transformation the Department of Defense has bought into the concept of network centric warfare and its ability to facilitate information dominance. As the military wargames and rehearses preemptive contingencies they must remain alert to peculiar C4ISR capabilities that may enhance the probability of success. Prioritization of C4ISR transformation initiatives that enhance the capabilities of those forces most likely to execute preemptive missions should be considered. The C4ISR network centric synergy demonstrated in the aforementioned Yemen strike may be the tip of the iceberg in the potential of these initiatives. 105 Not every preemptive act requires military action. Agencies, like the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation or Coast Guard will lead in some actions with the military in support or enabling roles. Some operations will be combined. All of these cases will place a premium on inter-agency cooperation. In many cases, ambassadors and country teams will play critical roles in enabling preemption. For example as advanced force SOF teams preposition for an impending preemption, a myriad of diplomatic and legal clearances will inevitably be required. The rapid execution of these activities may be biggest stumbling block to an effective strike. The Department of Defense in conjunction with the Department of State must work to streamline these activities. The Joint Interagency concept should be fostered and expanded as necessary to facilitate preemptive endeavors. Moreover, officers committed to interagency activities will have to possess the requisite acumen and skill sets for success in such an environment. 108 Non-lethal weapons function in three domains: "counter personnel, counter material and counter capability." Counter personnel weapons temporarily incapacitate or diminish the abilities of personnel. Counter material devices render equipment inoperable, while counter capability weapons involve the disabling or neutralization of infrastructure and facilities. Counter capability weapons could have powerful utility in attacks on WMD facilities. Police forces around the world have access to rubber bullets, stun guns and calmative agents that military forces can adapt and employ. Clearly, non-lethal weapons cannot substitute for standard weaponry, when killing force is required. However, lethal force may not be required in every preemptive or preventative operation. A combination of lethal and non-lethal weapons might provide the flexibility to use the right weapon depending on circumstances. Employing non-lethal means--when possible--could pay great dividends in justifying attacks, reinforcing legitimacy and demonstrating proportionality. This would be particularly useful in preemption where the potential for collateral casualties or damage is high, and in preventative attack situations where the threat is not imminent in nature. Given the nature of terrorist organizations, the intelligence to be gathered from prisoners could be extremely useful. Thus, the temporary incapacitation and apprehension of personnel should always be considered when feasible. Moreover, evidence so obtained may prove crucial to justifying action. Consider the SAS operation in Gibraltar (see note 102), if the commandos employed non-lethal weapons they could have captured the IRA terrorists while saving their government great embarrassment, and seizing the opportunity to gain valuable intelligence. Unfortunately, despite the enormous potential of non-lethal weapons, their military use has been limited to a few successful operations in Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo. Led by the United States Marine Corps, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate appears to be moving in the right direction. However, its $25 million budget limits progress. As DOD rolls up its sleeves on the details of preemption, serious consideration should be given to an expansion of its non- 
